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PROPOSITION REGULATES AMOUNTS OUTPATIENT KIDNEY DIALYSIS 
CLINICS CHARGE FOR DIALYSIS TREATMENT. 
INITIATIVE STATUTE.8
OFFICIAL TITLE AND SUMMARY P R E P A R E D  B Y  T H E  A T T O R N E Y  G E N E R A L
BACKGROUND
DIALYSIS TREATMENT
Kidney Failure. Healthy kidneys filter a person’s 
blood to remove waste and extra fluid. Kidney 
disease refers to when a person’s kidneys do 
not function properly. Over time, a person may 
develop kidney failure, also known as “end-
stage renal disease.” This means that the 
kidneys no longer function well enough for the 
person to survive without a kidney transplant 
or ongoing treatment referred to as dialysis.
Dialysis Mimics Normal Kidney Functions. 
Dialysis artificially mimics what healthy 
kidneys do. Most people on dialysis undergo 
hemodialysis, a form of dialysis in which blood 
is removed from the body, filtered through a 
machine to remove waste and extra fluid, and 
then returned to the body. A hemodialysis 
treatment lasts about four hours and typically 
occurs three times per week.
Most Dialysis Patients Receive Treatment in 
Clinics. Individuals with kidney failure may 
receive dialysis treatment at hospitals or in 
their own homes, but most receive treatment 
at chronic dialysis clinics (CDCs). As of 
May 2018, 588 licensed CDCs in California 
provided treatment to roughly 80,000 
patients each month. Each CDC operates an 
average of 22 dialysis stations, with each 
station providing treatment to one patient at 
a time. The California Department of Public 
Health (CDPH) is responsible for licensing 
and inspecting CDCs. Various entities own 
and operate CDCs. As shown in Figure 1, 
two private for-profit entities operate and have 
at least partial ownership of the majority of 
CDCs in California.
PAYING FOR DIALYSIS TREATMENT
Payment for Dialysis Treatment Comes From a 
Few Main Sources. We estimate that CDCs 
have total revenues of roughly $3 billion 
annually from their operations in California. 
These revenues consist of payments for 
dialysis treatment from a few main sources, or 
“payers”:
• Limits the charges to 115 percent of the 
costs for direct patient care and quality 
improvement costs, including training, 
patient education, and technology support. 
• Requires rebates and penalties if charges 
exceed the limit.
• Requires annual reporting to the state 
regarding clinic costs, patient charges, and 
revenue.
• Prohibits clinics from refusing to treat 
patients based on the source of payment for 
care.
SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S ESTIMATE 
OF NET STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
FISCAL IMPACT:
• Overall annual effect on state and local 
governments ranging from net positive 
impact in the low tens of millions of dollars 
to net negative impact in the tens of 
millions of dollars.
ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
The text of this measure can be found on the Secretary of State’s website at 
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov.
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• Medicare. This federally funded program 
provides health coverage to most people 
age 65 and older and certain younger 
people who have disabilities. Federal law 
generally makes people with kidney failure 
eligible for Medicare coverage regardless 
of age or disability status. Medicare pays 
for dialysis treatment for the majority of 
people on dialysis in California.
• Medi-Cal. The federal-state Medicaid 
program, known as Medi-Cal in California, 
provides health coverage to low-income 
people. The state and the federal 
government share the costs of Medi-Cal. 
Some people qualify for both Medicare 
and Medi-Cal. For these people, Medicare 
covers most of the payment for dialysis 
treatment as the primary payer and 
Medi-Cal covers the rest. For people 
enrolled only in Medi-Cal, the Medi-Cal 
program is solely responsible to pay for 
dialysis treatment.
• Group and Individual Health Insurance. 
Many people in the state have group 
health insurance coverage through an 
employer or another organization (such as 
a union). The California state government, 
the state’s two public university systems, 
and many local governments in California 
provide group health insurance coverage 
for their current workers, eligible retired 
workers, and their families. 
Some people without 
group health insurance 
purchase health insurance 
individually. Group and 
individual health insurance 
coverage is often provided 
by a private insurer that 
receives a premium 
payment in exchange 
for covering the costs 
of an agreed-upon set 
of health care services. 
When an insured person develops 
kidney failure, that person can usually 
transition to Medicare coverage. Federal 
law requires that a group insurer remain 
the primary payer for dialysis treatment 
for a “coordination period” that lasts 
30 months.
Group and Individual Health Insurers Typically 
Pay Higher Rates for Dialysis Than Government 
Programs. The rates that Medicare and 
Medi-Cal pay for dialysis treatment are 
relatively close to the average cost for CDCs 
to provide a dialysis treatment and are largely 
determined by regulation. In contrast, group 
and individual health insurers establish their 
rates by negotiating with CDCs. The rates 
paid by these insurers depend on the relative 
bargaining power of insurers and the CDCs. On 
average, group and individual health insurers 
pay multiple times what government programs 
pay for dialysis treatment. 
PROPOSAL
Requires Clinics to Pay Rebates When Total 
Revenues Exceed a Specified Cap. Beginning 
in 2019, the measure requires CDCs each 
year to calculate the amount by which their 
revenues exceed a specified cap. The measure 
then requires CDCs to pay rebates (that is, give 
money back) to payers, excluding Medicare 
and other government payers, in the amount 
that revenues exceed the cap. The more a 
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payer paid for treatment, the larger the rebate 
the payer would receive.
Revenue Cap Based on Specified CDC Costs. 
The revenue cap established by the measure 
is equal to 115 percent of specified “direct 
patient care services costs” and “health care 
quality improvement costs.” These include 
the cost of such things as staff wages and 
benefits, staff training and development, drugs 
and medical supplies, facilities, and electronic 
health information systems. Hereafter, we 
refer to these costs as “allowable,” meaning 
they can be counted toward determining 
the revenue cap. Other costs, such as 
administrative overhead, would not be counted 
toward determining the revenue cap.
Interest and Penalties on Rebated Amounts. In 
addition to paying any rebates, CDCs would be 
required to pay interest on the rebate amounts, 
calculated from the date of payment for 
treatment. CDCs would also be required to pay 
a penalty to CDPH of 5 percent of the amount 
of any required rebates, up to a maximum 
penalty of $100,000.
Rebates Calculated at Owner/Operator Level. 
The measure specifies that rebates would be 
calculated at the level of a CDC’s “governing 
entity,” which refers to the entity that owns or 
operates the CDC (hereafter “owner/operator”). 
Some owner/operators have many CDCs in 
California, while others may own or operate 
a single CDC. For owner/operators with many 
CDCs, the measure requires them to add up 
their revenues and allowable costs across all of 
their CDCs in California. If the total revenues 
exceed 115 percent of total allowable costs 
across all of an owner/operator’s clinics, they 
would be required to pay rebates equal to the 
difference.
Legal Process to Raise Revenue Cap in Certain 
Situations. Both the California Constitution and 
the United States Constitution prohibit the 
government from taking private property (which 
includes the value of a business) without fair 
legal proceedings or fair compensation. A 
CDC owner/operator might try to prove in court 
that, in their particular situation, the required 
rebates would amount to taking the value of 
the business and therefore violate the state or 
federal constitution. If a CDC owner/operator 
is able to prove this, the measure outlines 
a process where the court would reduce the 
required rebates by just enough to no longer 
violate the constitution. The measure places 
on the CDC owner/operator the burden of 
identifying the largest amount of rebates that 
would be legal. The measure specifies that any 
adjustment in the rebate amount would apply 
for only one year.
Other Requirements. The measure requires that 
CDC owner/operators submit annual reports to 
CDPH. These reports would list the number 
of dialysis treatments provided, the amount 
of allowable costs, the amount of the owner/
operator’s revenue cap, the amount by which 
revenues exceed the cap, and the amount of 
rebates paid. The measure also prohibits CDCs 
from refusing to provide treatment to a person 
based on who is paying for the treatment. 
CDPH Required to Issue Regulations. The 
measure requires CDPH to develop and issue 
regulations to implement the measure’s 
provisions within 180 days of the measure’s 
effective date. In particular, the measure 
allows CDPH to identify through regulation 
additional CDC costs that would count as 
allowable costs, which could serve to reduce 
the amount of any rebates otherwise owed by 
CDCs.
FISCAL EFFECTS
MEASURE WOULD REDUCE CDC PROFITABILITY
Currently, it appears that CDCs operating 
in California have revenues in excess of the 
revenue cap specified in the measure. Paying 
rebates in the amount of the excess would 
significantly reduce the revenues of CDC 
owner/operators. In the case of CDCs operated 
by for-profit entities (the majority of CDCs), 
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this means the CDCs would be less profitable 
or could even be unprofitable. This could 
lead to changes in how dialysis treatment 
is provided in the state. These changes 
could have various effects on state and local 
government finances. As described below, the 
impact of the measure on CDCs and on state 
and local government finances is uncertain. 
This is because the impact would depend on 
future actions of (1) state regulators and courts 
in interpreting the measure and (2) CDCs in 
response to the measure. These future actions 
are difficult to predict.
MAJOR SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY
Uncertain Which Costs Are Allowable. The 
impact of the measure would depend on 
how allowable costs are defined. Including 
more costs as allowable would make revenue 
caps higher and allow CDCs to keep more of 
their revenues (by requiring smaller rebates). 
Including fewer costs as allowable would 
make revenue caps lower and allow clinics 
to keep less of their revenues (by requiring 
larger rebates). It is uncertain how CDPH (as 
the state regulator involved in implementing 
and enforcing the measure) and courts would 
interpret the measure’s provisions defining 
allowable costs. For example, the measure 
specifies that the costs of staff wages 
and benefits are only allowable for “non-
managerial” staff that provide direct care to 
dialysis patients. Federal law requires CDCs to 
maintain certain staff positions as a condition 
of receiving Medicare reimbursement. Some 
of these required positions—including the 
medical director and nurse manager—perform 
managerial functions but are also involved 
in direct patient care. The costs of these 
positions might not be considered allowable 
because the positions have managerial 
functions. On the other hand, the costs of 
these positions might be considered allowable 
because the positions relate to direct patient 
care. 
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Uncertain How CDCs Would Respond to the 
Measure. CDC owner/operators would likely 
respond to the measure by adjusting their 
operations in ways that limit, to the extent 
possible, the effect of the rebate requirement. 
They could do any of the following:
• Increase Allowable Costs. CDC owner/
operators might increase allowable costs, 
such as wages and benefits for non-
managerial staff providing direct patient 
care. Increasing allowable costs would 
raise the revenue cap, reduce the amount 
of rebates owed, and potentially leave 
CDC owner/operators better off than if 
they were to leave allowable costs at 
current levels. This is because the amount 
of revenues that CDC owner/operators 
could retain would grow by more than the 
additional costs (the revenue cap would 
increase by 115 percent of additional 
allowable costs).
• Reduce Other Costs. CDC owner/operators 
might also reduce, where possible, 
other costs that do not count toward 
determining the revenue cap (such as 
administrative overhead). This would not 
change the amount of rebates owed, but it 
would improve the CDCs’ profitability.
• Seek Adjustments to Revenue Cap. If CDC 
owner/operators believe they cannot 
achieve a reasonable return on their 
operations even after making adjustments 
as described above, they might try to 
challenge the rebate provision in court 
to get a higher revenue cap as outlined 
in the measure. If such a challenge were 
successful, some CDC owner/operators 
might have a higher revenue cap and owe 
less in rebates in some years.
• Scale Back Operations. In some cases, 
owner/operators might decide to open 
fewer new CDCs or close some CDCs if the 
amount of required rebates is large and 
reduced revenues do not provide sufficient 
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return on investment to expand or remain 
in the market. If this takes place, other 
providers would eventually need to step 
in to meet the demand for dialysis. 
These other providers might operate less 
efficiently (have higher costs). Some other 
providers could potentially be exempt 
from the provisions of the measure if 
they do not operate under a CDC license 
(for example, hospitals). Such broader 
changes in the dialysis industry are 
difficult to predict. 
IMPACT OF REBATE PROVISIONS ON  
STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES
We estimate that, without actions taken by 
CDCs in response to the measure, potential 
rebates owed could reach several hundred 
million dollars. Depending on the factors 
discussed above, the measure’s rebate 
provisions could have several types of effects 
on state and local finances.
Measure Could Generate State and Local 
Government Employee Health Care Savings . . . 
To the extent that CDCs pay rebates, state 
and local government costs for employee 
health care could be reduced. As noted 
previously, the measure excludes government 
payers from receiving rebates. However, state 
and local governments often contract with 
private health insurers to provide coverage 
for their employees. As private entities, these 
insurers might be eligible for rebates under 
the measure. Even if they are not eligible 
for rebates, they would likely still be in a 
position to negotiate lower rates with CDC 
owner/operators. These insurers might pass 
some or all of these savings on to government 
employers in the form of reduced health 
insurance premiums. 
. . . Or Costs. On the other hand, as described 
above, CDCs might respond to the measure by 
increasing allowable costs. If CDCs increase 
allowable costs enough, rates that health 
insurers pay for dialysis treatment might 
increase above what they would have been in 
the absence of the measure. If this occurs, 
insurers might pass some or all of these higher 
costs on to government employers in the form 
of increased health insurance premiums.
State Medi-Cal Cost Pressures. The Medi-Cal 
program also contracts with private insurers 
to provide dialysis coverage for some of its 
enrollees. Similar to health insurers that 
provide coverage for government employees, 
private insurers that contract with Medi-Cal 
might also receive rebates (if they are 
determined to be eligible) or might be able 
to negotiate lower rates with CDC owner/
operators. Some or all of these savings might 
be passed on to the state. However, because 
rates paid to CDCs by these insurers are 
relatively low, such savings would likely be 
limited. On the other hand, if CDCs respond 
to the measure by increasing allowable costs, 
the average cost of a dialysis treatment would 
increase. This would put upward pressure on 
Medi-Cal rates and could result in increased 
state costs.
Changes to State Tax Revenues. To the extent 
the measure’s rebate provisions operate to 
reduce the net income of CDC owner/operators, 
the measure would likely reduce the amount 
of income taxes that for-profit owner/operators 
are required to pay to the state. This reduced 
revenue could be offset, to an unknown extent, 
by various other changes to state revenues. For 
example, additional income tax revenue could 
be generated if CDCs respond to the measure 
by increasing spending on allowable staff 
wages.
In Light of Significant Uncertainty, Overall Effect 
on State and Local Finances Is Unclear. Different 
interpretations of the measure’s provisions and 
different CDC responses to the measure would 
lead to different impacts for state and local 
governments. In light of significant uncertainty 
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about how the measure may be interpreted and 
how CDCs may respond, a range of possible 
net impacts on state and local government 
finances is possible.
Overall Effect Could Range From Net 
Positive Impact in the Low Tens of Millions 
of Dollars . . . If the measure is ultimately 
interpreted to have a broader, more inclusive 
definition of allowable costs, such as by 
including costs for nurse managers and 
medical directors, the amount of rebates CDC 
owner/operators are required to pay would be 
smaller. Under this interpretation, it is more 
likely that CDC owner/operators would respond 
with relatively modest changes to their cost 
structures. In this scenario, state and local 
government costs for employee health benefits 
could be reduced. These savings would likely 
be partially offset by a net reduction in state 
tax revenues. Overall, we estimate the measure 
could have a net positive impact on state and 
local government finances reaching the low 
tens of millions of dollars annually in this 
scenario.
. . . To Net Negative Impact in the Tens of 
Millions of Dollars. If the measure is ultimately 
interpreted to have a narrower, more 
restrictive definition of allowable costs, the 
amount of rebates CDC owner/operators are 
required to pay would be greater. Under this 
interpretation, it is more likely that CDC owner/
operators would respond with more significant 
changes to their cost structures, particularly 
by increasing allowable costs. CDC owner/
operators would also be more likely to seek 
adjustments to the revenue cap or scale back 
operations in the state. In this scenario, state 
and local government costs for employee 
health benefits and state Medi-Cal costs could 
increase. State tax revenues could also be 
reduced. Overall, we estimate the measure 
could have a net negative impact reaching 
the tens of millions of dollars annually in this 
scenario.
Other Potential Fiscal Impacts. The scenarios 
described above represent our best estimate 
of the range of the measure’s likely fiscal 
impacts. However, other fiscal impacts are 
possible. As an example, if CDCs respond to 
the measure by scaling back operations in the 
state, some dialysis patients’ access to dialysis 
treatment could be disrupted in the short 
run. This could lead to health complications 
that result in admission to a hospital. To the 
extent that dialysis patients are hospitalized 
more frequently because of the measure, 
state costs—particularly in Medi-Cal—could 
increase significantly in the short run.
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT
This measure imposes new responsibilities on 
CDPH. We estimate that the annual cost to 
fulfill these new responsibilities likely would 
not exceed the low millions of dollars annually. 
The measure requires CDPH to adjust the 
annual licensing fee paid by CDCs (currently 
set at about $3,400 per facility) to cover these 
costs. Some of these administrative costs 
may also be offset by penalties paid by CDCs 
related to rebates or failure to comply with the 
measure’s reporting requirements. The amount 
of any offset is unknown.
Visit http://www.sos.ca.gov/campaign-lobbying/cal-access-
resources/measure-contributions/2018-ballot-measure-
contribution-totals/ for a list of committees primarily formed 
to support or oppose this measure. Visit http://www.fppc.
ca.gov/transparency/top-contributors/nov-18-gen.html 
to access the committee’s top 10 contributors.
If you desire a copy of the full text of the state measure, 
please call the Secretary of State at (800) 345-VOTE (8683) 
our you can email vigfeedback@sos.ca.gov and a copy 
will be mailed at no cost to you.
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now known, described and designated by Act of 
Congress as “United States Standard Pacific 
Time.”
SEC. 5. Section 3 of the Daylight Saving Time 
Act is repealed.
Sec. 3. From 1 o’clock antemeridian on the 
last Sunday of April, until 2 o ’clock 
antemeridian on the last Sunday of October, the 
standard time in this State so established shall 
be one hour in advance of the standard time 
now known as United States Standard Pacific 
time.
SEC. 6. Section 4 of the Daylight Saving Time 
Act is repealed.
Section 4. In all laws, statutes, orders, 
decrees, rules and regulations relating to the 
time of performance of any act by any officer or 
department of this State, or of any county, city 
and county, city, town or district thereof or 
relating to the time in which any rights shall 
accrue or determine, or within which any act 
shall or shall not be performed by any person 
subject to the jurisdiction of the State, and in 
all the public schools and in all other 
institutions of this State, or of any county, city 
and county, city, town or district thereof, and in 
all contracts or choses in actions made or to be 
performed in this State, the time shall be as set 
forth in this act and it shall be so understood 
and intended.
SEC. 7. Section 5 of the Daylight Saving Time 
Act is repealed.
SECTION 5. All acts in conflict herewith are 
hereby repealed.
PROPOSITION 8
This initiative measure is submitted to the 
people in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 8 of Article II of the California 
Constitution.
This initiative measure adds sections to the 
Health and Safety Code; therefore, new 
provisions proposed to be added are printed in 
italic type to indicate that they are new.
PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. Name.
This act shall be known as the “Fair Pricing for 
Dialysis Act.”
SEC. 2. Findings and Purposes.
accordance with Section 10 of Article II of the 
California Constitution.
This proposed law adds a section to the 
Government Code and repeals sections of the 
Daylight Saving Time Act; therefore, provisions 
proposed to be deleted are printed in strikeout 
type and new provisions to be added are printed 
in italic type to indicate that they are new.
PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. If federal law authorizes the state 
to provide for the year-round application of 
daylight saving time and the Legislature 
considers the adoption of this application, it is 
the intent of this act to encourage the 
Legislature to consider the potential impacts of 
year-round daylight saving time on communities 
along the border between California and other 
states and between California and Mexico.
SEC. 2. Section 6808 is added to the 
Government Code, to read:
6808. (a) The standard time within the state is 
that of the fifth zone designated by federal law 
as Pacific standard time (15 U.S.C. Secs. 261 
and 263).
(b) The standard time within the state shall 
advance by one hour during the daylight saving 
time period commencing at 2 a.m. on the 
second Sunday of March of each year and 
ending at 2 a.m. on the first Sunday of 
November of each year.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), the 
Legislature may amend this section by a 
two-thirds vote to change the dates and times of 
the daylight saving time period, consistent with 
federal law, and, if federal law authorizes the 
state to provide for the year-round application of 
daylight saving time, the Legislature may amend 
this section by a two-thirds vote to provide for 
that application.
SEC. 3. Section 1 of the Daylight Saving Time 
Act is repealed.
Section 1. This act shall be known and may 
be cited as the Daylight Saving Time Act.
SEC. 4. Section 2 of the Daylight Saving Time 
Act is repealed.
Section 2. The standard time within the State, 
except as hereinafter provided, is that of the 
One Hundred and Twentieth (120th) degree of 
longitude west from Greenwich and which is 
76 | Text of Proposed Laws
TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS PROPOSITION 8 CONTINuED
8
(2) This act is intended to be budget neutral for 
the state to implement and administer.
SEC. 3. Section 1226.7 is added to the 
Health and Safety Code, to read:
1226.7. (a) Reasonable limits on charges for 
patient care by chronic dialysis clinics; rebates 
of amounts charged in excess of fair treatment 
payment amount.
(1) For purposes of this section, the “fair 
treatment payment amount” shall be an amount 
equal to 115 percent of the sum of all direct 
patient care services costs and all health care 
quality improvement costs incurred by a 
governing entity and its chronic dialysis clinics.
(2) For each fiscal year starting on or after 
January 1, 2019, a governing entity or its 
chronic dialysis clinics shall annually issue 
rebates to payers as follows:
(A) The governing entity shall calculate the 
“unfair excess charged amount,” which shall be 
the amount, if any, by which treatment revenue 
from treatments provided by all of the governing 
entity’s chronic dialysis clinics exceeds the fair 
treatment payment amount.
(B) The governing entity or its chronic dialysis 
clinics shall, on a pro rata basis based on the 
amounts paid and reasonably estimated to be 
paid, as those amounts are included in 
treatment revenue, issue rebates to payers 
(other than Medicare or other federal, state, 
county, city, or local government payers) in 
amounts that total the unfair excess charged 
amount.
(C) The governing entity or chronic dialysis 
clinic shall issue any rebates required by this 
section no less than 90 days and no more than 
210 days after the end of its fiscal year to which 
the rebate relates.
(D) If, in any fiscal year, the rebate the 
governing entity or chronic dialysis clinic must 
issue to a single payer is less than twenty dollars 
($20), the governing entity or chronic dialysis 
clinic shall not issue that rebate and shall 
provide to other payers in accordance with 
subparagraph (B) the total amount of rebates 
not issued pursuant to this subparagraph.
(E) For each fiscal year starting on or after 
January 1, 2020, any rebate issued to a payer 
shall be issued together with interest thereon at 
the rate of interest specified in subdivision (b) 
This act, adopted by the people of the State of 
California, makes the following findings and has 
the following purposes:
(a) The people make the following findings:
(1) Kidney dialysis is a process where blood is 
cleaned of waste and excess water, usually 
through a machine outside the patient’s body, 
and then returned to the patient. If someone 
who needs dialysis cannot obtain or afford high 
quality care, toxins build up in the body, leading 
to death.
(2) In California, at least 66,000 Californians 
undergo dialysis treatment.
(3) Just two multinational, for-profit 
corporations operate or manage nearly three-
quarters of dialysis clinics in California and treat 
almost 70 percent of dialysis patients in 
California. These two multinational corporations 
annually earn billions of dollars from their 
dialysis operations, including almost 
$400 million each year in California alone.
(4) Because federal law mandates that private 
health insurance companies offer and pay for 
dialysis, private insurance companies have little 
ability to bargain with the two multinational 
dialysis corporations on behalf of their 
customers.
(5) Thus, for-profit dialysis corporations charge 
patients with private health insurance four times 
as much as they charge Medicare for the very 
same dialysis treatment, resulting in vast profits.
(6) In a market dominated by just two 
multinational corporations, California must 
ensure that dialysis is fairly priced and 
affordable.
(7) Other states have taken steps to protect 
these very vulnerable patients from these two 
multinational corporations.
(8) Efforts to enact protections for kidney 
dialysis patients in California have been stymied 
in Sacramento by the dialysis corporations, 
which spent over $600,000 in just the first 
six months of 2017 to influence the California 
Legislature.
(b) Purposes:
(1) It is the purpose of this act to ensure that 
outpatient kidney dialysis clinics provide quality 
and affordable patient care to people suffering 
from end stage renal disease.
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shall be replaced by the lowest possible whole 
number such that application of the provision to 
the governing entity or chronic dialysis clinic 
will not violate due process or effect a taking of 
private property requiring just compensation. In 
any civil action, the burden shall be on the 
governing entity or chronic dialysis clinic to 
propose a replacement number and to prove 
that replacing “115” with any whole number 
lower than the proposed replacement number 
would, for the fiscal year in question, violate 
due process or effect a taking of private property 
requiring just compensation.
(b) Compliance reporting by chronic dialysis 
clinics.
(1) For each fiscal year starting on or after 
January 1, 2019, a governing entity shall 
maintain and submit to the department a report 
concerning all of the following information for 
all of the chronic dialysis clinics the governing 
entity owns or operates in California:
(A) The number of treatments performed.
(B) Direct patient care services costs.
(C) Health care quality improvement costs.
(D) Treatment revenue, including the difference 
between amounts billed but not yet paid and 
estimated realizable revenue.
(E) The fair treatment payment amount.
(F) The unfair excess charged amount.
(G) The amount, if any, of each payer’s rebate, 
provided that any individual patient shall be 
identified using only a unique identifier that 
does not reveal the patient’s name or identity.
(H) A list of payers to whom no rebate was 
issued pursuant to subparagraph (D) of 
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) and the amount 
not issued, provided that any individual patient 
shall be identified using only a unique identifier 
that does not reveal the patient’s name or 
identity.
(2) The information required to be maintained 
and the report required to be submitted by this 
subdivision shall each be independently audited 
by a certified public accountant in accordance 
with the standards of the Auditing Standards 
Board of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants and shall include the 
opinion of that certified public accountant as to 
whether the information contained in the report 
fully and accurately describes, in accordance 
of Section 3289 of the Civil Code, which shall 
accrue from the date of payment by the payer.
(3) For each fiscal year starting on or after 
January 1, 2019, a governing entity shall 
maintain and provide to the department, on a 
form and schedule prescribed by the 
department, a report of all rebates issued under 
paragraph (2), including a description of each 
instance during the period covered by the 
submission when the rebate required under 
paragraph (2) was not timely issued in full, and 
the reasons and circumstances therefor. The 
chief executive officer or principal officer of the 
governing entity shall certify under penalty of 
perjury that he or she is satisfied, after review, 
that all information submitted to the department 
under this paragraph is accurate and complete.
(4) In the event a governing entity or its chronic 
dialysis clinic is required to issue a rebate under 
this section, no later than 210 days after the 
end of its fiscal year the governing entity shall 
pay a penalty to the department in an amount 
equal to 5 percent of the unfair excess charged 
amount, provided that the penalty shall not 
exceed one hundred thousand dollars 
($100,000). Penalties collected pursuant to 
this paragraph shall be used by the department 
to implement and enforce laws governing 
chronic dialysis clinics.
(5) If a chronic dialysis clinic or governing 
entity disputes a determination by the 
department to assess a penalty pursuant to this 
subdivision or subdivision (b), or the amount of 
an administrative penalty, the chronic dialysis 
clinic or governing entity may, within 
10 working days, request a hearing pursuant to 
Section 131071. A chronic dialysis clinic or 
governing entity shall pay all administrative 
penalties when all appeals have been exhausted 
and the department’s position has been upheld.
(6) If a governing entity or chronic dialysis 
clinic proves in any court action that application 
of this section to the chronic dialysis clinic or 
governing entity will, in any particular fiscal 
year, violate due process or effect a taking of 
private property requiring just compensation 
under the Constitution of this state or the 
Constitution of the United States, the provision 
at issue shall apply to the governing entity or 
chronic dialysis clinic, except that as to the 
fiscal year in question the number “115” 
whenever it appears in the provision at issue 
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unaffiliated third party, including but not limited 
to a governing entity, an independent staffing 
agency, a physician group, or a joint venture 
between a chronic dialysis clinic and a physician 
group; (ii) staff training and development; (iii) 
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies; (iv) 
facility costs, including rent, maintenance, and 
utilities; (v) laboratory testing; and (vi) 
depreciation and amortization of buildings, 
leasehold improvements, patient supplies, 
equipment, and information systems. For 
purposes of this section, “nonmanagerial 
chronic dialysis clinic staff” includes all clinic 
personnel who furnish direct care to dialysis 
patients, including nurses, technicians and 
trainees, social workers, registered dietitians, 
and nonmanagerial administrative staff, but 
excludes managerial staff such as facility 
administrators. Categories of direct patient care 
services costs may be further prescribed by the 
department through regulation.
(2) “Governing entity” means a person, firm, 
association, partnership, corporation, or other 
entity that owns or operates a chronic dialysis 
clinic for which a license has been issued, 
without respect to whether the person or entity 
itself directly holds that license.
(3) “Health care quality improvement costs” 
means costs, other than direct patient care 
services costs, that are related to the provision 
of care to chronic dialysis patients and that are 
actually expended for goods or services in 
California that are required to maintain, access, 
or exchange electronic health information, to 
support health information technologies, to train 
nonmanagerial chronic dialysis clinic staff 
engaged in direct patient care, and to provide 
patient-centered education and counseling. 
Additional costs may be identified by the 
department through regulation, provided that 
such costs are actually spent on services offered 
at the chronic dialysis clinic to chronic dialysis 
patients and are spent on activities that are 
designed to improve health quality and to 
increase the likelihood of desired health 
outcomes in ways that are capable of being 
objectively measured and of producing verifiable 
results and achievements.
(4) “Payer” means the person or persons who 
paid or are financially responsible for payments 
for a treatment provided to a particular patient 
and may include the patient or other individuals, 
primary insurers, secondary insurers, and other 
with generally accepted accounting principles in 
the United States, the information required to 
be reported under paragraph (1).
(3) The governing entity shall annually submit 
the report required by this subdivision to the 
department on a schedule, in a format, and on a 
form prescribed by the department, provided 
that the governing entity shall submit the 
information no later than 210 days after the end 
of its fiscal year. The chief executive officer or 
other principal officer of the governing entity 
shall certify under penalty of perjury that he or 
she is satisfied, after review, that the report 
submitted to the department under paragraph 
(1) is accurate and complete.
(4) In the event the department determines that 
a chronic dialysis clinic or governing entity 
failed to maintain the information or timely 
submit a report required under paragraph (1) of 
this subdivision or paragraph (3) of subdivision 
(a), that the amounts or percentages reported by 
the chronic dialysis clinic or governing entity 
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision were 
inaccurate or incomplete, or that any failure by 
a chronic dialysis clinic or governing entity to 
timely issue in full a rebate required by 
subdivision (a) was not substantially justified, 
the department shall assess a penalty against 
the chronic dialysis clinic or governing entity 
not to exceed one hundred thousand dollars 
($100,000). The department shall determine 
the amount of the penalty based on the severity 
of the violation, the materiality of the inaccuracy 
or omitted information, and the strength of the 
explanation, if any, for the violation. Penalties 
collected pursuant to this paragraph shall be 
used by the department to implement and 
enforce laws governing chronic dialysis clinics.
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(1) “Direct patient care services costs” means 
those costs directly associated with operating a 
chronic dialysis clinic in California and providing 
care to patients in California. Direct patient care 
services costs shall include, regardless of the 
location where each patient undergoes dialysis, 
only (i) salaries, wages, and benefits of 
nonmanagerial chronic dialysis clinic staff, 
including all clinic personnel who furnish direct 
care to dialysis patients, regardless of whether 
the salaries, wages, or benefits are paid directly 
by the chronic dialysis clinic or indirectly 
through an arrangement with an affiliated or 
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SEC. 6. Nothing in this act is intended to 
affect health facilities licensed pursuant to 
subdivision (a), (b), or (f) of Section 1250 of 
the Health and Safety Code.
SEC. 7. The State Department of Public 
Health shall issue regulations necessary to 
implement this act no later than 180 days 
following its effective date.
SEC. 8. Pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 
10 of Article II of the California Constitution, 
this act may be amended either by a subsequent 
measure submitted to a vote of the people at a 
statewide election, or by a statute validly passed 
by the Legislature and signed by the Governor, 
but only to further the purposes of the act.
SEC. 9. The provisions of this act are 
severable. If any provision of this act or its 
application is held invalid, that invalidity shall 
not affect other provisions or applications that 
can be given effect without the invalid provision 
or application.
PROPOSITION 10
This initiative measure is submitted to the 
people in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 8 of Article II of the California 
Constitution.
This initiative measure repeals and adds 
sections to the Civil Code; therefore, existing 
provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in 
strikeout type and new provisions proposed to 
be added are printed in italic type to indicate 
that they are new.
PROPOSED LAW
The Affordable Housing Act
The people of the State of California do hereby 
ordain as follows:
SECTION 1. Title.
This act shall be known, and may be cited, as 
the “Affordable Housing Act.”
SEC. 2. Findings and Declarations.
The people of the State of California hereby find 
and declare all of the following:
(a) Rents for housing have skyrocketed in recent 
years. Median rents are higher in California than 
any other state in the country, and among all 
50 states, California has the fourth highest 
increase in rents.
entities, including Medicare and any other 
federal, state, county, city, or other local 
government payer.
(5) “Treatment” means each instance when the 
chronic dialysis clinic provides services to a 
patient.
(6) “Treatment revenue” for a particular fiscal 
year means all amounts actually received and 
estimated realizable revenue for treatments 
provided in that fiscal year. Estimated realizable 
revenue shall be calculated in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles and 
shall be a reasonable estimate based on (i) 
contractual terms for patients covered under 
commercial healthcare plans with which the 
governing entity or clinics have formal 
agreements; (ii) revenue from Medicare, 
Medicaid, and Medi-Cal based on rates set by 
statute or regulation and estimates of amounts 
ultimately collectible from government payers, 
commercial healthcare plan secondary coverage, 
patients, and other payers; and (iii) historical 
collection experience.
SEC. 4. Section 1226.8 is added to the 
Health and Safety Code, to read:
1226.8. (a) A chronic dialysis clinic shall not 
discriminate with respect to offering or providing 
care, and shall not refuse to offer or provide 
care, to patients on the basis of the payer for 
treatment provided to a patient, including but 
not limited to on the basis that the payer is a 
patient, private payer or insurer, Medi-Cal, 
Medicaid, or Medicare.
(b) A chronic dialysis clinic shall not terminate, 
abridge, modify, or fail to perform under any 
agreement to provide services to patients 
covered by Medi-Cal, Medicaid, or Medicare on 
the basis of requirements imposed by this 
chapter.
SEC. 5. Section 1266.3 is added to the 
Health and Safety Code, to read:
1266.3. It is the intent of the people that 
California taxpayers not be financially 
responsible for implementation and enforcement 
of the Fair Pricing for Dialysis Act. In order to 
effectuate that intent, when calculating, 
assessing, and collecting fees imposed on 
chronic dialysis clinics pursuant to Section 
1266, the department shall take into account 
all costs associated with implementing and 
enforcing Sections 1226.7 and 1226.8.
